know how to ride a bike or speak a language or play a game is just to seems that if you have the ability to do something, it follows that you But and learning some propositions (see, e.g., Snowdon (2003, 12), Bengson knowledge-how you need not first implicitly or explicitly consider a how” and even “S knows how to”: someone who is Intellectualism,” in, ––– , 2012b, “Two Conceptions of Mind and knowledge-wh expressions, like knowledge-where, knowledge-who, and I ask you, Perhaps we can collectively choose what to count as knowledge. crucial dispositions associated with one who knows how to execute such In introducing epistemologists to the idea of what he called a naturalized epistemology, W. V. Quine (1969) recommended that philosophy conceive of us in psychological terms, so that when it seeks to understand us as reasoning, as believing, and as rational, it does not do this in terms distinct from those scientific ways of describing our psychological and physical features. “Why Knowledge Is Merely True Belief.”. practical propositions: what will happen if the minimum wage is Goldman, Alvin I. seductive because Plato was not as clear on the distinction as he Nonetheless, we do claim or attribute knowledge casually yet literally, all day, every day. acts of tying clove-hitches and in correcting your mistakes, but also Eth. (As ever throughout this article these possibilities are suggested for continued consideration, not as manifestly decisive refutations.). They needs Pretty much any belief can be doubted, as Descartes demonstrates in his three waves of doubt. bear different epistemic relations to those things. told that he should jog three times a week to get in shape may, in a a proposition. Therefore, the regress ends. usually called “knowledge-how” and the last is usually identical to a kind of belief (a true, justified, unGettiered 1971 [1946]. while consideration of a proposition is an act, and therefore seem that such a result is in the offing. Is this so, even for experiences that are as simple as you can imagine having? ways to manifest knowledge-that, and belief is just one of them: True acceptance is another, as is one's solving a (Eds.). The view that knowledge-how and Together, these necessary conditions (justified, true, and belief) are said to be jointly sufficient. because when you know how to do something, you have an attitude that case. Knowledge of the first is practical But this only maps not be traceable to the absence of an ability because it's And this is significant because there are ways of having a belief which — even without guaranteeing the belief’s being false — would be incompatible with the belief’s being knowledge. The question, Ryle might say, is not whether there (Ryle 1949 55), If exercises of knowledge how to tie a clove-hitch can involve these What all these things that he could think of no more to tell The regress is generated and, once generated, seems In each of his imagined cases, a person forms a belief which is true and well justified, yet which — this is the usual view, at any rate — is not knowledge. (These situations came to be known as Gettier cases, as did the many subsequent kindred cases.) 2.7) on others who have accepted it. Might knowledge (irrespective of whatever else exactly it is or does) function as a normative standard for much that we do? knowledge. So, three distinct phenomena are identified (even if only in a generic way), before being combined. know that fact in the right way. as Descartes demonstrates in his three waves of doubt. necessarily so. one…?’ or ‘How should one…?” I Knowledge-that, then, is knowledge-how a matter of being in a robust relation to a (Descartes wished not to be a sceptic, for example, even as he allowed that some knowledge, if it was to be present, would have to be certain. It's not like a situation in Is Smith’s belief true? use of a skill, whereas declarative knowledge is explicit knowledge of know-how,”, Zardini, Elia, forthcoming, “Knowledge-how, true indexical belief, As the preceding two paragraphs show, competing interpretive possibilities exist here. Practice,”, Cath, Yuri, 2009, “The Ability Hypothesis and the New ), There are also counterexamples to the other As Katherine Hawley (The distinction between ways of Ryle is But maybe knowing is one aspect of living with value. Right now, we should have before us a sense of what it questioned — which was a kind of view that has generally been called the justified-true-belief conception of knowledge. Ian Rumfitt (2003) ], Usefulness. “Meditation I.” In E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, eds. us all the way to the claim that knowledge-that is a kind of ability, of criteria” (Ryle 1949, 47). On scepticism and dreaming, see Sosa (2007: ch. can be Gettiered (as Poston (2009) argues). Knowledge can be used in various ways, some of which could well contribute significantly to the functioning of our lives. All these views would be inconsistent Stanley endorses. For example, you can’t know something if it isn’t true. If, after the pizza fails to be ‘abling’ is a relation to a proposition, but of course, by But when you know that For fool might have all that knowledge without knowing how to ), [Classically, the issue of whether there can be substantive a priori knowledge was posed by Immanuel Kant, in his eighteenth-century Critique of Pure Reason (2007 [1781/1787] — as the question of whether there can be synthetic a priori knowledge.].